Maintaining a resilient computer network is a delicate task with conflicting priorities. Flows should be served while controlling risk due to attackers. Configuration is time intensive and largely static until a major new vulnerability forces change. Tools exist to check network reachability (Khurshid et al., NSDI 2013) and risk using (probabilistic) attack graphs (Sheyner et al., IEEE S&P 2002). However, these tools are not designed to fashion configurations that simultaneously satisfy multiple properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network configuration is an impossible job. While it may be possible to satisfy all functional requirements, network engineers are also tasked with securing the network. To carry out their job, engineers rely on network appliances to assess the network state (load, good and bad data flows, congestion,...) and public vulnerability databases and security appliances to assess the presence of risks within applications hosted on the network. They have to integrate both sources to assess the overall risk posture of the network and decide how to mitigate unacceptably high risks.
(Probabilistic) Attack graphs are one way to address the first question [1] and are used to assess the risk posture. An attack graph is a labeled transition system that models the capabilities that an adversary has on hosts within a network and how those can be elevated by transitioning to new states via the exploitation of vulnerabilities (e.g., a weak password, a bug in a software package, the ability to guess a stack address,...). The attack graph can be used to discover the paths that an adversary may use to escalate his privileges to the point where he can compromise a given target (e.g., customer database or an administrator account). Estimations of the probabilities of success along paths coupled with the value of the targets characterize the risk assumed by the network owner [2] , [3] .
Deciding how to mitigate risk is more delicate. While modern attack graphs can issue recommendations that indicate which edges are most critical [2] , [4] - [7] (which exploits should be patched, where a firewall must be stood up, etc...) to decrease the overall risk in the network, they do not account for the loss in functionality (i.e., the collateral damage) that they induce. In the extreme, a complete risk averse operator can fully air gap their network, providing full protection from outside threats at the expense of service delivery. Thus, the recommendations may not be worthwhile, feasible or economically sound. Furthermore, recommendations must be implemented manually increasing response time.
A more desirable scenario to cope with emerging threats is: 1) A security appliance identifies a problematic flow/user (signaling a change in a component's risk) or a new vulnerability is published in a NVD (National Vulnerability Database) [8] , [9] , 2) An attack graph is generated, 3) Recommendations derived from the resulting graph, and 4) Recommendations are programmatically deployed and implemented The challenge to deliver this vision is threefold: first, the size of attack graphs grow quickly and are expensive to (re)generate; second, attack graphs ignore functionality requirements and; third, it is unclear how to quickly and transparently deploy recommended changes.
A. Our contribution
To address the deployment challenges, we focus on software defined networks (SDN) and recommendations that can be implemented through control APIs of SDN controllers.
For concreteness, we evaluate our approach on data-center networks which frequently use virtualized networking [10] . The primary technical contribution of this paper is a holistic optimization framework we call FASHION for Functional and Attack graph Secured HybrId Optimization of virtualized Networks. FASHION considers both functionality and security when deciding how to configuration the network. The functional layer is a multi-commodity data flow problem that routes the flows while respecting capacity. The primary technical contributions are in the security layer:
1) A measure that approximates the risks as modeled by attack graphs. This approximation, which relies on linear programming, delivers quick calculation of risk on related networks. There are two attack graph representations whose size may differ by an exponential factor. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis on the smaller representation that is amenable to optimization. We discuss the distinction between the two representations in the next paragraph. 2) A solver that uses the desired network flows, network structure and the risk of individual components to calculate a deployment of network assets and security measures that optimizes both function and risk. The model for the linear and integer programming solver focuses on reconfiguring the network. Its output is fed to a tool which creates a high-level SDN controller implementing the configuration. Specifically, FASHION's output interfaces with a Frenetic controller [11] .
A major problem in attack graphs is their scalability [12] , [13] as they consider all paths an attacker could take to achieve their objective. Two common graph representations are an attack dependency graph and an attack state graph. In the dependency view each node represents an exploit or capability in the network. The main drawback of the dependency representation is that analysis of overall risk is difficult. The second representation is the attack state graph. In this representation each node represents an attacker's current capabilities. This representation simplifies analysis; however, an exponential blowup in representation size makes it prohibitively expensive for moderate size networks [13] , [14] .
Several works have used optimization to create attack graph recommendations [2] , [15] . To the best of our knowledge, there has been no analysis of attack dependency graphs which is conducive to repeated evaluation on related graphs (differing by the introduction of a defensive countermeasure or a new flow). Our developed risk measure is an approximation of a prior measure described by Wang et al. [16] (described in Sec. III) and consists of a weighted sum of two parts:
Reach:The total impact of the nodes that are reachable by the attacker. This translates to an attack graph where each nonzero probability edge is assumed to be compromised. The first generation of attack graphs considered this measure [17] - [21] . Path: The risk (impact*likelihood) of the maximum path in the network. Prior work by Khouzani et al. [3] used this measure in attack state graphs (see Section II).
Looking ahead to the evaluation (Section V), we use Wang et al.'s algorithm as ground truth for the evaluating the security of our resulting configurations. In all generated instances our metric of avg(Reach, Path) is monotonic in Wang et al's algorithm (which is far too slow to be used in an optimization). FASHION usually outputs a configuration in under 10 minutes, allowing response to short term events (on networks with 128 hosts and 81 networking devices).
B. Limitations
FASHION is not applicable for all networks at all times. FASHION is not an "add on" to the existing infrastructure of a legacy system. However, the landscape is shifting towards SDN controlled data centers which provide the flexibility and programability required [22] .
FASHION requires full integration and control over network configuration. While a human could review the proposed configuration before implementation, such an interface would likely require an explanation engine that provided supporting evidence for changes being made. FASHION can provide evidence of optimality but converting this to a human interpretable form is future work.
Furthermore, there are barriers to adopting attack graphs. Major criticisms of attack graphs include the difficulty finding the necessary inputs [23] , [24] , the difficulty in implementing the output recommendations [25] , and scaling issues. Indeed, to implement the attack graph recommendation, it is necessary to interpret their output, a task deemed too difficult and too remote from the network to be actionable [26] . FASHION is designed to address this problem. Scalability remains a limitation (further discussion in Section VI). The size of attack graphs is a weakness, driving the time it takes to generate and analyze them. The evolution of networking environments towards SDN provides the perfect opportunity for integration with attack graphs. SDN offers a centralized control and holistic view of the network no longer requiring external scanning tools to discover reachability data [27] .
C. Driving Example
This section describes a toy example that is used to illustrate the concepts used throughout the paper. Recall that the objective of the framework is to produce a collection of decisions to configure the network devices (routers, firewall, ...) to serve the functional requirements while minimizing the risks incurred by the network. In this work we consider routing decisions on flows only (including blocking a flow).
We assume white list routing where only desirable flows are carried to their destination. This corresponds to all extraneous flows in the network already not being severed. The primary reason for this decision is that it places FASHION in the region where there is a sharp tradeoff between functionality and security. If one has an attack graph that routes using flows that are not necessary to functionality, this routing can be disabled at no cost to functionality. Furthermore, we assume devices can use source routing which allows more flexibility in our security decisions and ability to respect capacity. Figure 1 (a) illustrates the physical layer of the network. The following conventions are used:
• circle are routers • square are hosts • black lines are physical connections (wires) It features 3 SDN appliances, nodes 0, 1 and 2 that route traffic as well as block it (act as firewalls). The toy network features 4 hosts, 3 through 6. This mini network can support different paths between the SDN appliance 0 and any host (e.g., host 3). For example, 0 → 2 → 3 and 0 → 1 → 3.
This physical network must be configured to serve traffic demand. Table I shows a collection of data flows in the form s → t conveying that traffic emanating from node s must reach node t. Each data flow has a type (here A or B). Each data flow also carries an economic value shown by the number of $ signs.
Unfortunately, hosts in this network have vulnerabilities. Table II shows four exploits. Each exploit has one or more preconditions to be triggered as well as effects and a probability of succcess. A pair (h, p) states that the adversary secured capability p on host h where the ordered set of capabilities is {0, 1}. Privilege level 0 represents the ability to send traffic to that host, it is augmented with the traffic type (either A or B).
show possible outputs of the framework, i.e., a configuration that defines routing tables for each SDN appliance (including explicit firewalls). In this network configuration, the following conventions are added:
• gray nodes are routers that are blocking traffic • black (resp. blue) arrows are type A flows (resp. B) • dashed arrows represent blocked traffic Figure 2 , conveys the attack graph for this network. For instance from having capability 0 on host 0 (the entry point) one can transition to having capability 0 on host 3 (host 3 is reachable from SDN device 0). The red diamond node exploit 0 shows that exploiting the vulnerability on host 3 will deliver a privilege escalation, i.e., capability 1 on host 3. On this simple toy example the attack graph is a directed acyclic graph and all exploits are assuming to be exploitable with probability 1. FASHION's full model does not include either assumption. Figure 2 uses the following conventions:
• square nodes represents the entry point of the network • green square NET nodes represent network reachability • diamond nodes are exploits • circle nodes are (host,privilege) states.
• black (resp. blue) arrows correspond to network connection of type A (resp. B) • incoming red links are precondition states of exploits • outgoing red links are postcondition states of exploits Figure 1 (b) shows a configuration resulting from FASHION in which the objective was exclusively the maximization of the functional objective (total flow). All data flows are served and no counter-measures are deployed, leaving the network exposed to an adversary as shown by the existences of paths that reach the target nodes (6, 1) and (4, 1) (in Fig. 2 ).
Alternatively, Figure 1 (c) conveys a configuration at the opposite end of the spectrum where security is paramount. The attack graph in Figure 2 shows that the easiest way to block access to the 4 exploit nodes is to sever the edge b (0 → 3). Indeed, if one cannot reach host 3, exploit 0 is not usable and the hosts 4 and 5 are unreachable preventing the attacker from leveraging exploits 1 through 3. In Figure 1 (c) node 0 is now blocking all traffic of type "A." In this configuration, the internal traffic proceeds unabated. However, the high "commercial" value of flow 0 → 3 was not respected doing great damage to the economic value of the network service. This solution may be acceptable if the security of the internal resources greatly outweighs the external network reachability. In some settings, though, this extreme focus on security at the expense of functionality may be uncalled for.
Finally, Figure 1 (d) brings us to an interesting trade-off where the interplay between competing priorities become apparent. In this solution, the flow 0 → 3 is served because of its intrinsic economic value while edges e and d in the attack graph (corresponding to routing 3 → 4 : B and 3 → 5 : A respectively) are turned off. More precisely, these flows are routed to node 2 which is a firewall for both traffic types as shown in Figure 1 (d) This is done to prevent the attacker traversing edges h and i and then being able to use exploits 1, 2, 3. This unconventional placement of countermeasures prevents an adversary from reaching the capability nodes (6, 1) and (4, 1) while still preserving the most valuable functional part of the network. To gain additional insight into why edges e and d (flows 3 → 4 : B and 3 → 5 : A) are turned off note that in Table II (4, 0 : B) and (5, 0 : A) are preconditions for 3 of the 4 exploits in Figure 2 . This combined with the value of flows in Table I makes these the right edges to cut. The sacrifice made to the adversary is accepting the risk of him reaching host 3 and securing elevated privilege 1 on that host. Organization The organization of this work proceeds as follows. We introduce the most relevant related work in Section II. Section III introduces background on attack graphs on the measures we will optimize over, Section IV documents Table I , the exploits in Table II and the corresponding attack graph in Figure 2 . Figure 1 (a) shows the set of available network links that can be used by the optimization framework. Figure 1 Figure 1 the optimization model, Section V evaluates FASHION, and Section VI concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
Researchers have proposed high-level SDN programming languages in order to efficiently express packet-forwarding policies and ensure correctness when dealing with overlapping rules [11] , [28] . These languages focus on parallel and sequential composition of policies to ensure modularity while providing correctness guarantees. Importantly, when our framework proposes a set of new rules for the controller it is necessary to ensure that good traffic is not lost [29] .
To aid in network configuration, research tools assess network reachability [30] , network security risk [31] , [32] , and link contention [33] , [34] . Note that these tools assess the quality of a configuration with respect to a single property and do not provide recommendations.
Our work can be seen as unifying two recent works, one by Curry et al. [35] and another by Khouzani et al. [3] . Curry et al. proposed an optimization framework for deciding on a network configuration based on the given desired network functionality of data flows and the underlying physical network. Curry et al. showed how to produce a network configuration that meets all demands while blocking adversarial traffic. In their model, each network node has an input risk and nodes assume a fraction of the risk of any node with which they share a path. However, their risk measure does not take into account network structure or the ability of an adversary to pivot in the network.
Khouzani et al. [3] created an optimization engine designed to minimize security risk as represented by an attack graph. They show how to formulate the most effective attack path of an attack graph using a linear program. Their functionality view is limited to imparting an explicit numeric functional cost to each remedial action. It is unclear how to create these input costs used in the model or what to do if the functional requirements are non-linear. Importantly, Khouzani et al.'s formulation requires attack state graph. In practice, attack state graphs are exponential in the size of the network, as each set of capabilities is a distinct node [14] . Our Path measure also measures the maximum likelihood path. However, since our measure operates on an attack dependency graph it corresponds to a slightly different property. We discuss this in Section III.
Two primary areas for improvement clearly emerge. First, it is desirable to integrate realistic functionality concerns directly into the decision making process. Second, a novel risk measurement that simultaneously allows optimization and a tractable attack graph is needed.
III. ATTACK GRAPHS
FASHION's goal is to balance the functionality and security needs of the network. Functionality needs are relatively straightforward to state: a set of desired network flows that should be carried in the network while respecting link capacity. Security is more complicated to state. We use the abstraction of attack graphs.
Attack graphs model the most likely paths that an attacker could use to penetrate a network [1] , [18] , [20] , [36] . In the attack graph model attackers traverse the network to reach their target(s) network resource. This traversal may combine traditional network capability such as routing with exploitation of a software/hardware vulnerability. An attack graph assumes an attacker starts at some entry point such as a publicly facing Web page and through a series of privilege escalations and network device accesses pivots to eventually reach his or her desired destination. (The technology supports an arbitrary starting point if one wishes to consider insider attacks.) We focus our discussion here on attack dependency graphs as defined by Homer et al. [37] . Another common type of graph is called an attack state graph. We discuss the distinction between these two data structures in Section III-A. For brevity, we just refer to attack dependency graphs as attack graphs.
There are two types of nodes in an attack graph: capabilities, denoted C, and exploits denoted as ex. An exploit requires some number of capabilities as preconditions. If an attacker has successfully obtained those preconditions they are assumed to gain all successors of ex with some probability. Example capabilities include ability to send packets, user level authority, root level authority. Example exploits include an SQL injection which requires an ability to send packets and a SQL server running a specific software version. A successor of this exploit node may be root level access on the device running the SQL server. In the attack graph in Figure 2 , when an attacker executes Exploit 0, they achieve privilege level 1 on node 3 with some probability.
Building an attack graph requires network reachability information, device software configurations and known exploit information [8] , [9] , [38] , [39] to generate the graph. Attack graphs are only effective in measuring how an attacker would traverse using known vulnerabilities and system state. While it is possible to consider the implications of a new vulnerability [5] this is not a native capability.
In isolation a misconfigured device which allows unauthorized access may be benign but when coupled with network access to ex-filtrate data or pivot to additional targets the results can be devastating. The goal of constructing and analyzing an attack graph is to understand the security posture in total.
An attack graph should allow one to understand defensive weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in the network. Since all enterprises have limited budgets, the goal of this analysis is usually to prioritize changes that have the largest impact.
A. The size of attack graphs
Since their introduction, a major problem in attack graphs is their scalability [12] , [13] . They consider all paths an attacker could take to achieve their objective. There are two very different ways of representing the graph that are called an attack dependency graph and an attack state graph. In the dependency view each node represents an exploit or capability in the network. It may be possible to achieve a capability using many different paths. Furthermore, multiple conditions may be necessary to achieve this capability, for example, network reachability of a database machine and a SQL injection attack. This is the view presented in Figure 2 .
In the most general form, each exploit has an associated Boolean structure (indicating when the exploit can be obtained) and a probability (indicating attacker success rate in carrying out the exploit). Capability nodes are annotated with an impact value that signifies the cost of an adversary achieving that capability (following the NIST cybersecurity framework guidance [40] ). In this work, we focus on exploits that are AND and OR prerequisites (and not arbitrary Boolean formulae). Note the dependency representation may have cycles. The main drawback of the dependency representation is that analysis of overall risk is difficult. Even if one assumes that probability associated with each edge is independent, calculating the overall probability requires consideration of all paths, and there may be infinite paths from the starting point to a target if the graph has cycles. We return to this problem after describing the state representation and prior work on quickly evaluating attack graphs on similar enterprises.
The second representation is the attack state graph. In this representation each node represents an attacker's current capabilities. Suppose there are k capabilities in the network. In the state representation, there are 2 k nodes representing whether the attack currently has each of the capabilities 1, ..., k. In the dependency representation, the attack graph has k capability nodes and some number of exploit nodes. This representation is acyclic and makes it very easy to carry out analysis [14] . However, an exponential blowup in representation size makes it prohibitively expensive for moderate size graphs [14] . Khouzani et al's model [3] requires the state representation to minimize risk.
B. Evaluating related attack graphs
In this work we focus on the ability to repeatedly evaluate an attack graph on related networks. The ability to perform this analysis quickly is critical to utilizing attack graphs in our optimization framework. The ability to regenerate the attack graph multiple times at decreased cost has been addressed recently in related contexts.
Almohri et al. [41] considered an attack graph setting where the defender has incomplete knowledge of the network. An example source of this uncertainty is mobile device movement. They then construct attack graphs using a probabilistic model which includes the uncertainties in network configuration. In our setting, we are trying to find the best configuration under a variety of settings, Almohri el al. would be appropriate if the functionality and security requirements could not be unified as it could provide recommendations under a variety of related functional settings.
Frigault and Wang [42] argue that it is inaccurate to measure probabilities with a fixed probability of exploit. They argue that factors such as patches being available will decrease the threat while wide spread distribution of vulnerability details may increase the threat. As such, they conduct attack graph analysis where the graph is static but probabilities can change over time. Poolsappasit et al. [7] also argue that the probability of attack success changes over time.
Note that if one is willing to consider a complete attack graph then all changes in the graph can be represented with a change in probability. However, this is akin to considering the state representation as one needs to consider an edge from each subset of nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, Khouzani et al.'s work is the only work that considers defensive actions that can drastically change the attack graph and a formulation of the risk calculation graph that is amenable to optimization. However, their model is inherently tied to the state graph representation.
C. Formalizing the problem
In this subsection, we define the risk measure that we take as our ground truth when evaluating FASHION's output. Our metric is drawn from Wang et al. [16] augmented with impact for each node. Wang et al.'s metric assumes an attack graph where the probability of achieving each exploit is independent. Since paths in an attack graph often overlap, the probability of achieving prerequisites of an exploit may not be independent. This simplifying assumption is frequently used because considering correlated probabilities makes the problem significantly harder [37] . We note that our derived metrics use only edge probabilities (see Section III-D), so one could evaluate our results using a risk metric that does not assume independence. Consider the following notation:
• Let EX be the set of all exploits.
-Let EX n be the network reachability exploits (to model the underlying dynamic network) and EX v be the set of vulnerability exploits, EX = EX n ∪ EX v . -Let EX AND be the set of AND exploits and EX OR be the set of OR exploits, EX = EX AND ∪ EX OR . -We assume that EX n ⊆ EX OR . Network reachability is treated as OR considering the possibility of several traffic types between network hosts. -Exploit nodes, ex ∈ EX, are augmented with a probability p(ex) that represents the probability of carrying out the exploit assuming all prerequisites have been satisfied. This probability can be estimated using vulnerability databases [8] , [9] , [38] . Note that p(ex) is a component metric, we seek to capture the cumulative risk in the network (see discussion in [16] , [43] ).
• Let C represent the set of all capabilities in the underlying network. Capabilities nodes are augmented with an impact Pact :
• Then the edge set E is the union of two sets:
-R r ⊆ C × EX which represent the prerequisites needed to achieve an exploit.
yielded by achieving an exploit.
• Let Start ⊆ C denote a set of capabilities that the adversary is believed to have.
For any node n we use Pred(n) to denote all of its predecessors in the graph, {v|(v, n) ∈ E}, and Succ(n) to denote all of its successors in the graph, {v|(n, v) ∈ E}.
Having defined the graph itself we now consider the overall risk that we wish to compute. We start with a description of how to compute overall risk in the absence of cycles and then consider cycles. Our discussion follows heavily from Wang et al.'s [16] methodology. Their formulation is centered on Bayesian inference, we augment their model with an impact for each capability node.
Our primary goal is to compute cumulative scores P (ex) and P (c) for each node in the graph, these nodes represent the likelihood that an attacker reaches the specified node in the graph. 1 If these scores are calculated one may consider overall risk as:
The remainder of this section is dedicated to how to compute P (·). We start by considering the acyclic case and then consider cycles. For AND exploits, the cumulative score is the product of all predecessors and p(ex). For OR exploits, the cumulative score is the sum of all predecessors component score minus the product of each pair of probability scores (using Bayesian reasoning). All capability nodes are treated as OR nodes. For a set X, we define the operator Bayes : X → [0, 1] as:
Definition III.1 (Network Risk). [16, Definition 2] Given an acyclic attack graph G and any component score assignment function p : EX −→ [0, 1] , the cumulative score function P :
Note that P (n) can be computed for all n ∈ N as long G is acyclic. P (n) can be computed once its P (e) is known for all e ∈ Pred(n). Thus, there exists at least one topological ordering that allows this computation (and all topological orderings result in the same computation). For a given acyclic attack graph let algorithm ARisk(G) compute P (n i ) for n i ∈ N . Handling Cycles We now turn to Wang et al's [16] adaption of the above risk formulation that handles cycles. This metric will be used to evaluate our security measures which are introduced in the next subsection (Section III-D). Wang et al. make the following observations. [16]:
1) Cycles with no entry point can be safely ignored and all nodes can be set to 0 likelihood. 2) We only need to measure the probability of an attacker reaching a node for the first time. Thus, consider a cycle with only one incoming edge, denote by n the node with the incoming edge. We can safely compute P (n) without considering the cycle as any path that traverses the cycle will have already included n. Thus, the cycle edge returning to n can be ignored.
3) The difficult case are cycles with multiple entry points.
These cannot be easily handled by removing an edge from the graph. The key observation here is no path that an attacker traverses will actually follow the cycle. Different paths will include subsets of edges from the cycle. Wang et al. propose the following methodology for handling cycles with multiple entry points [16] . This methodology assumes that all nodes that can be topologically sorted have been and their cumulative probabilities assigned. Let X represent a cycle with at least two entry points. The key observation is that for each entry point x ∈ X we can compute P (x) without considering Succ(x). While x's successors are important in calculating the overall risk they do not impact P (x). So we can compute a new attack graph G which has all Succ(x) removed and use this to calculate P (x). Importantly, the graph G may still have cycles which inhibit computation of P (x) but this process can be performed recursively. Once this recursion terminates it is repeated for all entry points in the cycle. Once all entry points have their likelihood computed, the rest of the cycle can be safely evaluated and ARisk can continue.
Note that some parts of the computation can be reused throughout the recursion (all nodes that were sorted before the cycle was encountered) but the likelihoods computed in this process for x = x are not the true likelihoods and cannot be reused between recursive steps.
We have implemented this algorithm that computes this risk recursively through cycle removal. When we use the term Risk(G) we are referring to this metric. As mentioned above, we will evaluate the output of our model with respect to Risk(G). As we discuss in Section V this algorithm is not nearly fast enough to be incorporated into an optimization framework that is considering many possible solutions. The implementation is in Python and has been open-sourced along with the rest of FASHION [44] .
D. Approximating Risk
In order to incorporate cumulative risk into an optimization framework, we turn to approximations of risk that can be linearized. The risk calculation presented in Definition III.1 and its augmentation for handling cycles is non-linear. To the best of our knowledge, even a closed form of the calculated value is not known. We consider two approximations to serve as proxies. After introducing these approximations, we remark on the strengths and weaknesses of both of these approximations and why they complement each other well. We defer to Section V to remark on quality of our measures.
We call these two approximations Reachability and Max attack. The qualitative differences in the two approximations may make either measure (or a combination) appropriate for a given set of network parameters (scale of network, traffic, pattern, vulnerabilities).
Reachability Instead of using the raw probability of exploitation, we binarize them.
The value θ is a threshold used to determine whether a capability should either be ignored or considered attained. We consider θ = 0. Since p(n) ∈ {0, 1}, we can apply standard Boolean linearization techniques to get a tractable representation of dynamic risk.
Utilizing the binary representation of exploits in Equation 2 is an approximation, measuring how an attacker can impact a target network. Since we consider θ = 0 this measures the total impact of nodes reachable by the adversary. This is equivalent to calculating the weighted size of the connected components in G that contains Start. The first generation of attack graphs did not consider annotate nodes with probability and measured this quantity [18] , [45] . This models the worst case approach when calculating attacker compromise of network capabilities and assumes that the all vulnerabilities with probability of exploitation above a threshold will be successfully exploited.
However, this approach does have a weakness when the goal is to jointly optimize functionality and security. Consider two nodes a and b where Pact(a) = 2 * Pact(b). Further suppose, at least a or b must remain in the connected component to satisfy functionality demands. The reachability metric will prioritize disconnecting b. However, it may be that the attacker is less likely to reach b and this decision is not optimum. This may be the case even if p(b) ≥ p(a) (it is possible that P (a) > P (b) even in this case due to the likelihood of reaching their predecessors).
Max Attack The second risk measurement we introduce is the attacker's most likely course of action. This measure is based on Khouzani et al.'s most effective attack measure [3] . We introduce the measure first and then say how our approach differs from Khouzani et al. [3] .
Let s be the attacker's starting point in the attack graph. We define ω σ→c to be the set of all paths, where a path is sequence of edges (e 1 , . . . , e k ) such that e i ∈ E, from σ to c in the attack graph. Let Λ c ∈ [0, 1] be the normalized impact of an attacker obtaining capability c. Then the most effective attack path is defined as follows.
Instead of having multiple targets, an auxiliary target µ is considered, that will be the sole target capability of the attacker. To do this, edges from each c ∈ C to an auxiliary exploit ex c are introduced, such that p(ex c ) = Λ c . Then we introduce an edge from each ex c to µ. Doing this, we can reformulate equation 3 as:
However network defenses can be deployed in order to reduce the probabilities of these exploits. Let x d ∈ {0, 1} be a binary decision variable denoting whether a network defense d has been deployed. Let p d (ex) be the reduced probability of exploit ex due to network defense d. With this, the probability of exploit ex with respect to network defense decision x d is given by
Therefore we want to minimize the risk due to the most effective path risk over all the possible configurations of network defenses available. This approach identifies appropriate locations to deploy network defenses in order to protect both high value capabilities with low exploitablity as well as lower value, more exploitable assets. We will incorporate these defense decisions when defining our optimization model in section IV. Path(G) follows closely to Khouzani et al.'s most effective attack. Note that Path does not distinguish between a graph with 2 paths with the same underlying probability and a single path with that probability. In addition to this inaccuracy (that was present in Khouzani et al.'s work) working on the attack dependency graph introduces two sources of error:
1) Path only counts the impact from the last node on the path. This is because it is only measuring the probability of a path and the impact is added as a "last layer" in the graph. So it doesn't distinguish between two paths (of equal probability) where one path has intermediate nodes with meaningful impact. In the attack state representation each node has the current capabilities of the attack and thus impact of this node set can be added as a last layer. 2) The path used to determine Path may not be exploitable by an adversary due to AND nodes. That is, the path may include a node with multiple prerequisites and the measure only computes the probability of exploiting a single prerequisite. In the attack state representation there are no AND nodes so this problem does not arise. Balancing Reach and Path. As described above both Reach and Path have inherent weaknesses. We believe (and demonstrate in Section V) that FASHION outputs better solutions when considering both metrics. We call the weighted sum of these two functions Hybrid. This is because Reach and Path mitigate each other's weaknesses. However, even a joint optimization over both metrics is still heuristic.
Reach is effective at isolating nodes that don't need to communicate. However, when there is a tie between two nodes that could be excluded, Reach may not make the right decision because it does not know the likelihood of reaching these nodes. However, Path's measure can effectively break ties on which node to remove based on the maximum likelihood path that reaches the node.
Path is effective at isolating nodes that have a high probability path to them. Yet, this measure does not account for the other nodes compromised "on the way" to the target node. By minimizing the total weighted reachable set using Reach this weakness is partially mitigated. Similarly, if two paths have similar probability but one contains multiple AND prerequisites, it may have a larger reachable component, enabling Reach to again break ties.
IV. OPTIMIZATION MODEL
This section highlights the content and structure of the optimization model used to obtain network configurations that uphold a balance between functionality and security. The detailed model can be found in Appendix A.
The optimization model is a binary integer programming (BIP) model as all decision variables are binary. The model contains two components dedicated, respectively, to the modeling of the data network and its job as a carrier for data flows and to the representation of the attack graph and the modeling of induced risk measures Reach and Path. The core decision variables fall in two categories.
First, Boolean variables modeling the routing decisions of the data flows in the network are associated to network links and subjected to flow balance equations as well as link capacity constraints that capture the valid delivery of flows and the functional rewards associated to those deliveries based on the flow values.
Second, Boolean variables associated to the deployment of counter-measures in the network. In this work, countermeasures are routing a flow to a firewall (rather than its destination). Auxiliary Boolean variables are introduced to facilitate the expression of the model and setup channeling constraints that tie the attack graph model to the network routing model so that routing as well as blocking decisions are conveyed to the attack graph side and result in severing arcs that express pre-conditions of exploits.
While the constraints devoted to capturing reachability, i.e., Reach, are relatively straightforward, the modeling of the most effective path, i.e., Path is more delicate for two reasons. First, it requires the use of products of probabilities held in variables yielding a non-linear formulation. Thankfully, that challenge can be side-stepped by converting those products into sums with a logarithmic transform. Second, it delivers a min − max problem that needs to be dualized to recover a conventional minimization.
The objective function combines (linearly) two linear expressions capturing the functional objective and the risk objective. Both are weighted with a parameter α that allows the model user to play with the risk-functionality trade-off. Namely, the objective is of the form min
The risk objective O s is itself a linear combination of three components:
O d
The cost of the security measures β 1 · O r The weighted Reach risk β 2 · O p The weighted Path risk.
Notably, using β 1 = 0, β 2 = 1 delivers a model that exclusively consider Path as its risk measure while β 1 = 1, β 2 = 0 focuses exclusively on the Reach risk measure. Without loss of generality, let β = β 1 and β 2 = 1 − β with β ∈ [0, 1]. The parameterization gives a hybrid risk measure based on a convex combination of Path and Reach. Two key parameters of the optimization models are, therefore, α and β that control the functionality-risk tradeoff and the balance between Path and Reach measures.
V. EVALUATION

In this section we show the efficacy and efficiency of FASHION. The goal is to understand 1) does FASHION produce configurations that effectively balance functionality and security? and 2) does FASHION produce configurations quickly? what time scale of events can FASHION respond to?
A. Experimental Setup
To the best of our knowledge, no standard benchmarks for attack graphs exist. For the purpose of this paper, we created a benchmark suite with instances that model a general case scenario for data center topology, traffic patterns and utilization rates along with a realistic representation of dispersed network vulnerabilities. A high level breakdown of the benchmark characteristics can be found in Table III . The evaluation is made on a Linux machine with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 2.00 GHz and 64GB of RAM. In total we generated more than 500 instances.
Network Topology The generated instances are of the popular Clos [46] style network topology Fat-tree [10] and are representative of a cloud data center. Fat-tree features an expanding pod structure of interconnected and tiered switches providing excellent path redundancy. The topology is designed to deliver high bandwidth to many end devices at moderate cost while scaling to tens of thousands of hosts. Following Fat-tree's economy of scale approach, switch and link capacities in all benchmarks are 1GBps. The benchmarks include small to medium sized instances. The largest instance we test includes 128 hosts, 81 switches and 400 links between devices. Network Traffic Network demand is modeled after the recent Global Cloud Index (GCI) report [47] which provides a global aggregated view of data centers. The benchmarks include two distinct traffic patterns: Internal at 70% and External at 30% (by combining GCIs Inter-data center 15% and Internet 15%).
Research shows that there exists heavy-tailed distributions for the volume and size of data flows [48] . There are generally small (1Mb-10Mb) and large (100Mb-1Gb) sized flows with 90% of the traffic volume being small and 10% large [49] , all benchmarks follow this distribution.
Each flow is randomly labeled with a traffic type to account for the range of traffic in DCNs such as HTTP,HTTPS,SMB... [50] . One-third of the instances have 1 traffic type, one-third of the instances have 2 traffic types and the one-third of instances have three traffic types. Each flow is assigned a flow value at random from the set {1, 2, 3, 5, 25}. Finally, Network utilization is impacted several factors such as time of day [51] , or application distribution [52] , [48] . The number of flows per host is varied across benchmarks with steps {1, 3, 5, 10} to generate the variation in network utilization.
As an illustrative example of the benchmark generation process consider a 54 host instance with 10 flows per host. This results in 540 total flows. Each flow is first randomly assigned as internal (70%) or external (30%). Next, the source and destination are randomly selected, two distinct hosts for internal or one host and the Gateway router for external. (Note, the Gatway is the demarcation point between the network and the Internet) Each flow is then assigned a size, traffic type and value based on the distributions provided above. Finally, each flow is duplicated reversing the source and destination to represent two-way traffic.
Vulnerabilities Synthetic vulnerabilities are injected on hosts within the network. The generation adopts several components from the vulnerability model presented the recent CVSS 3.1 Base metrics focusing on exploitability and impact [8] . The instances select a percentage of hosts as exploitable hosts ranging in {10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%} and the average number of vulnerabilities per vulnerable host (1-5) which drive the total number of vulnerabilities injected. The number of vulnerabilities per host is representative of Zhang et al's findings [53] from scans of publicly available VMs after patching was performed.
Each vulnerability is assumed to have one or more prerequisite conditions, a random probability of exploitation and a Network Topology
Network Traffic
Vulnerabilities pod Hosts Switch Links  #traffic  #flows  Exploits  AG edges  min max min  max  min max  min  max  2  4  6  9  1  3  8  80  1  10  18  165  4  16  21  52  1  3  16  160  1  40  258  2350  6  54  46  171  1  3  54  540  5  108  2928  26463  8  128  81  400  1  3  128 1280  12  250 16422 147627  TABLE III  BENCHMARK DATA. THE NUMBER OF LINKS REPRESENTS THE NUMBER OF BI-DIRECTIONAL LINKS IN THE NETWORK. THE #TRAFFIC COLUMN   REPRESENTS THE NUMBER OF DISTINCT TRAFFIC TYPES. single post condition of privilege escalation (if successfully exploited). Three privilege levels {0, 1, 2} are assumed with 0 denoting networking reachability.
With probability 50% each generated exploit has a single precondition, 25% probability to have 2 preconditions and 25% probability to have 3 preconditions. Procedurally, the single precondition exploits are generated at random from selected exploitable hosts, each allowing the escalation of a single step in privilege level. If the required number of single precondition exploits exceeds the number of exploitable hosts additional hosts are infected. The multi-precondition exploits are generated by selecting one prerequisite randomly from the pool of existing (single precondition) exploits and generating a new exploit which increases the privilege of one of the input exploits, the other prerequisites are selected randomly from the current set of achievable capabilities.
The impact of a successful exploit is reflective of value of the threatened asset. We uniformly assigned each host a integer Pact value from [1, 100] . The value to an attacker is a percentage of the asset's value that depends on the privilege secured by the attacker on that host. The quantities [10%, 20%, 50%] are used as the scaling factors for the three privileges {0, 1, 2}.
B. Results
We organize our results discussion around answering the two questions introduced in the beginning of Section V: does FASHION produce good configurations and does it do so in a timely manner? Answering the first question is slightly delicate because our security optimization is using Reach and Path instead of using Risk. Throughout this section we only report on the security quality of the final configuration with respect to Risk. The algorithm for computing Risk is too slow to use in the optimization model but allows an effective check on the quality of the solution (see Section V-B3). In all of our results the functionality score is the normalized value of the delivered traffic. That is, we consider the total value of traffic delivered when α = 1 (corresponding to the optimization considering only functionality) as functionality score of 1, the rest of functionality scores are normalized by this value. Similarly, we normalize Risk in the same way, computing the Risk value when α = 1 (no protections deployed) and use this as the denominator for other configurations. Note when α = 1 this corresponds to a baseline Risk for all tradeoffs of the security model. This is because the β parameter and the cost of countermeasures are not included in the model. 1) Does FASHION produce good configurations?: Section III-D argues that combining the two security models would produce better configurations than having β = 0 or β = 1. This was confirmed in our experiments. In Figure 3 we show a representative instance's solution set for varying α and β. Setting β = 1 produced a meaningful tradeoff between functionality and security. However, when we consider 1 > β > 0 in the Hybrid manner the solution quality is improved (e.g., α = .7 improves functionality without impacting security). In all analyzed solutions, varying α with just the Path measure active (β = 0) produced solutions that varied Path but not the actual Risk (other than blocking the gateway).
Thus, the setting of β ∈ (0, 1) seems crucial, but the particular value within (0, 1) does not seem to have a substantial effect on solution quality. This would be the case if one model is primarily being used as a tie-breaker for the other model. However, we cannot rule out that different settings of β would be preferable on different classes of networks and attack graphs.
For the remainder of our analysis we consider β = .5 corresponding to Path and Reach having the same weight in FASHION. Using this setting of β = .5 we now ask if FASHION produces solutions that trade off between functionality and security. As a reminder, we use whitelist, source routing in this work so setting α = 1 corresponds to the minimum risk that is achievable while routing all desirable flows (assuming routing all flows is feasible within bandwidth constraints). Any further minimization of risk necessitates decreasing functionality. Furthermore, since we consider an external attacker, blocking all flows at the entry point is always the solution chosen when functionality is not considered (optimizing over only risk). Thus, every instance has functionality and risk of 0 when α = 0. We remove this point from all analysis and consider α > 0.
Recall that FASHION is approximating Risk using Reach and Path so its possible for a decrease in α to lead to worse risk and functionality. However, in all of our experiments, risk and functionality were both monotonic for steps of α of size .1. 2 We consider 212 benchmarks of pod size of 6, each having 54 hosts. Varying α for each benchmark we plot both the functionality scores against α and also the risk scores against α. The functionality and risk scores are normalized as previously stated. Figure 4 demonstrates the probability mass functions of every instance solution varying α = .1 to α = 1 in steps of .1.
Note that the functionality scores across all benchmarks are relatively stable for α ≥ .1 while the risk scores vary significantly. Importantly, at every point on this curve FASHION is computing and outputting a corresponding network configuration. Note that in addition to considering what flows to include, the solution also describes how to route flow in a way that respects (and load balances) switch capacity. Based on visual inspection we classified our instances into three types of attack graphs. Instances with the most area under the curve It seems common in such instances for nodes with exploits to serve as an endpoint in many of the desired flows. In one generated pod 4 attack graph, a node with an exploit was the end point for a flow from 11 of the 15 other hosts. "Disconnecting" this node from the network required sacrificing many flows. This makes the functionality versus security tradeoff sharp. Note such a graph can occur in practice when many clients need to access a critical resource such as a database. Instances with the least area under the curve It seems common in such instances for flows with high value to be mostly distinct from exploitable nodes. In one instance with 98 total flows, it is possible to achieve risk 0 by only blocking 15 flows. Such instances can be seen as easy: the risky nodes are not crucial to functionality. Instances with many tradeoffs It seems common in such instance to have exploitable hosts that have a meaningful but not overwhelming value of flow. In these cases, FASHION can mitigate risk in two ways: by severing external connections to prevent an attacker from entering the network, or by sev-ering internal connections to prevent an attacker from moving laterally through network.
To illustrate this scenario and the corresponding choices, we consider one pod 4 attack graph with four exploitable nodes. These four nodes are all involved in both external and internal flows. Here the external flows were typically of higher value than that of internal flows, making FASHION sacrifice the internal flows for the sake of security at larger values of α. However as α decreases, external flows begin to be blocked which allows for previously severed internal flows to be serviced once again, as they are no longer needed to prevent lateral movement since the attacker cannot necessarily enter the network through external gateways. Table IV shows the balance of external and internal flows blocked in this instance. In this instance, the larger sets of blocked internal flows at smaller values of α were not supersets of smaller sets of blocked internal flows seen at larger α values. This demonstrates an important capability of FASHION: the ability to recognize defenses whose current marginal cost (to functionality) exceeds their value (to security). 2) Does FASHION produce configurations in a timely manner?: To verify the scalability of FASHION and its ability to react to short term events, it is valuable to assess performance as a function of various input size parameters. Experiments were done on Fat-tree networks with pod sizes 6 and 8. For each size, the number of flows per hosts and the number of exploits per host were increased to assess the impact on the runtime. Figure 5 shows the model solve times when scaling the number of exploits, while Table V shows the model solve times when scaling the number of flows per host. Two key observation emerge. First both the number of hosts and flows contribute significantly to the time. This is not surprising as the amount of hosts and flows increase the sizes of both the network and the attack graph, resulting in a large increase to the model size. A second observation is that the number of exploits alone can also cause a rise in solve time, as it directly affects the size of the attack graph. Yet, the volume of exploits does not have as dramatic impact as the number of hosts/flows. That is sensible as the number of exploits does not affect the size of the network. That is, increasing flows and hosts effects both functionality and security size while increasing exploits only effects security model size. These evaluations show that for networks of up to 128 hosts affected by a substantial number of flows and exploits, the framework produces optimal configurations within 3-7 minutes. In comparison to related work only considering attack graphs, Ingols et al. [5] build a non-probabilistic attack graphs for networks with nearly 40,000 hosts; they can output reachability of targets in approximately 2 minutes. Homer et al. [37] build probabilistic attack graphs on networks with 100 hosts, their attack graph generation takes between 1-46 minutes depending on the complexity of the exploit chains. Both prior works generate attack graphs for static network configuration with no consideration of the routing problem. Ingols et al. group hosts in equivalence classes which can be done in our model as well. Naturally, placing nodes in equivalence classes creates a scalability versus fidelity tradeoff.
FASHION's response time (on networks of this scale) allows automated response to short term events. It would take human network engineers at least this amount of time to identify a valid solution and mitigate risk, let alone one that is provably optimal. In an actual deployment, where the model must be solved repeatedly over time as inputs slightly evolve, the runtime can be drastically reduced when resolving the model by priming the optimization with the solution of the previous generation [54] , [55] . 3) Can Risk be directly used?: Figure 6 shows the time required to compute the actual Risk, with α = .7 and using our Python implementation of the algorithm by Wang et al. [16] of the network configuration output by FASHION. The instances considered use 128 hosts, with 12 to 250 vulnerabilities. Over this set of benchmarks, the computation time for the risk values in a fixed configuration can reach 100 seconds for 250 exploits. The time to evaluate the actual risk seems correlated to the number of exploits, and the evaluation algorithms start to struggle even with a relatively small number (e.g., 50 exploits). The search space associated with this kind of problem is generally huge (more than billions). Consequently, using this algorithm specification of Risk would likely yield a highly non-linear formulation that are prone to being intractable in practice. Reverting to an enumeration of configurations and computing the risk a posteriori would be obviously intractable given even the fastest runtime cost (outlined above) that would be incurred at each leaf. Linearization is essential to deliver a responsive and practical framework to assist network administrators.
VI. CONCLUSION
Configuring Software Defined Networks to maximize the volume of customers data flows to and from servers while respecting device and link capacities is a classic flow optimization problem. Protecting such a network from adversaries attempting to exploit vulnerabilities that plague specific devices and hosts is equally important to address within organizations. Attack graphs are effective in modeling risk and finding mitigations (defensive measures). Unfortunately, risk and functionality are antagonistic objectives and optimizing one without caring for the other is unhelpful as it will deliver extreme solutions that are impractical. This paper considers both challenges in a holistic fashion and automatically computes new SDN configurations for network devices in response to emergent changes in demand, component risk or exploit discoveries. The FASHION framework models the customer demands, network devices and link capacities. It also captures two notions of risk, Path and Reach under an attackdependency graph model within the overall optimization. The output from FASHION includes routing decisions for SDN devices as well as firewall mitigation decisions.
The paper demonstrates that FASHION can explore the trade-off between functionality and risk. As stated, FASHION optimizes over both objectives but the model can easily be converted into one where either security or functionality is a constraint and the other objective is optimized. The average of Path and Reach is an effective linearizable stand in for a risk calculation that is prohibitive to compute on the scale needed for a configuration search problem. Interestingly, the novel hybrid risk model enables FASHION to overcome their respective weaknesses and produce better solutions. From a practical angle, FASHION runs in matter of minutes on networks of reasonable size (128 hosts) and demonstrates potential for scalability. Finally, the empirical results indicate that the approximation adopted by FASHION does not jeopardize key properties such as monotonicity of functionality vs. risk.
The FASHION framework delivers a first step towards handling both functionality and risk for short-term response while producing consistent results with natural interpretations. Future directions include addressing not only source-routing but also destination routing within the network; handling scalability of the model size that currently depends on the number of network edges as well as the number of data flows; supporting a more varied set of controls beyond routing and blocking.
APPENDIX
A. Full Model Description
In this section we describe the optimization model used to obtain network configurations that uphold a balance between functionality and security. For functionality we model multicommodity network flow and tie functional success to the delivery of flows in the network. For security we consider both the cost of deploying network defenses and the risk present based on known exploits, end-to-end network connections, and an attacker's traversal through an attack graph created for the network. In particular, we utilize two different metrics for approximating network risk:
1) an attacker's reachability of nodes in the attack graph (based on Equation 1) 2) the most effective attack path present in the attack graph [3] In mixed integer programming, the four primary components are Inputs, Variables, Constraints, and an Objective function. These are listed below. 
Attack Graph Reachability
This part of the model is devoted to the attack graph, specifically which capabilities an attacker can reach. It creates channels between variables of the networking model and variables of the attack graph. It also models the semantics of AND and OR nodes as well reachability within the attack graph. x i,ex , ∀ex ∈ EX AND
r ex = i∈Pred(ex)
x i,ex , ∀ex ∈ EX OR (20)
Equation 18 models an OR node. Namely, it states that the capability n is enable if the adversary can traverse at least one inbound arc (coming from an exploit). Equation 19 models an AND node. Namely, it states that the exploit n is enabled provided that all inbound arcs can be traversed by the adversary. Equation 20 models an OR node in a similar fashion.
x i,j = r i a i,j , ∀(i, j) ∈ E
Equation 21 enables an arc (i, j) in the attack graph if its source is reachable and the arc was not cut by a i,j .
Equations 22 state that arcs that are incident on a vulnerabilitybased exploit x are always enabled while equation 23 states that the attacker's starting point σ, which has arcs leading to every n ∈ Start, is always reachable. is a channeling constraint connecting the presence of an network-connection-based arc in the attack graph to reachability in the network model.
Most Effective Path
This part of the model focuses on capturing an attacker's most effective attack path, which is formulated in Equation 4 , and embedding it within a minimization. To model this in a mixed integer program, we use the strategy presented by Khouzani et al. [3] . First, we note that Equation 4 is equivalent to the following. 
Here γ e is a binary decision variable that indicates whether an edge e is on the most effective attack path. Equation 28 enforces that the edges chosen will form a path from σ, the global attack graph starting point, to µ, the global attack graph target. Here h(e) and t(e) denote the head j and tail i of an edge (i, j). And since the objective function maximizes the probability of the taken path, as the product scales with an edge's probability if the edge is taken and 1 otherwise, this formulation is equivalent to equation 4. However, as written, this formulation is not linear, as there is a product of variables in the objective function, and thus cannot be directly incorporated into a linear mixed integer program. We can address this concern by composing the above objective with the monotonic function log(·). log e∈E (γ e p(t(e)) + (1 − γ e )) = e∈E log(γ e p(t(e)) + (1 − γ e ))
And considering that γ e ∈ {0, 1}, the above equation can be further simplified to e∈E γ e log(p(t(e)). With this we now have the following optimization problem to model the most effective attack path. Now we have obtained a linear formulation for the most effective attack path, but there is one more issue to address. The formulation is a maximization that we will be minimizing when synthesizing network configurations. Formulating this problem as a min-max is not desirable, so instead of solving the above maximization problem to find the most effective attack path, we will instead solve its dual, which is a minimization problem with the same optimal solution. The dual model is given below. min y y σ − y µ (28) s.t. y t(e) − y h(e) ≥ log(p(t(e))) ∀e ∈ E Note that because of the ability to deploy network defenses, we can apply log(·) to equation 5 to obtain: log(p(t(e))) = (1 − x) log(p(t(e))) + x log( ).
Since we apply log to the probabilities, we cannot have an exploit with a probability of zero. Thus we use a very small number to model the scenario where network defenses reduce the likelihood of an exploit to zero. In particular, this is how completely severing host-to-host communications in the network can cut edges incident to network reachability exploits in the attack graph. Now that we have formulated the most effective attack path as a minimization problem, it can be incorporated directly into the objective function of our overall minimization problem.
Objective
The objective function in this model is comprised of two components, a functionality cost and a security cost. Below we give the expression for the functionality score O f .
The first term yields a credit for routing good flows through the network from their source to their destination and is scaled by the assigned value of the flow. The second term describes the cost incurred by routing flows though the network based on the cost of the links use to carry each flow. The security score is comprised of three pieces:
• cost of deploying network defenses • risk due to attack graph reachability • risk due to the most effective attack path. The cost incurred from network defenses, O d , is below.
The first two terms describe the cost paid for deploying flowspecific and traffic-specific firewalls, respectively. The third term gives a penalty per unique network device deploying any kind of firewall and it a way to reduce network complexity by encouraging the concentration of multiple firewalls to a few devices.
The risk due to attack graph reachability, O r , considers which capabilites an attacker can reach and yields the appropriate cost for allowing the attacker to gain these capabilities.
O r = n∈C r n · Pact(n)
The risk due to the most effective attack path, O p , is given by O p = y σ − y µ .
We will denote the overall security cost O s as
Note that here we can vary β 1 to have the framework prefer one risk metric over the other. The overall objective that dictates a balance between functionality and security is given below.
Here we have the ability to vary α to influence the framework to produce network configurations that favor functionality over risk or vice versa.
